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Inholding Access Toolbox
The Inholding Access Toolbox is a 'work in progress' and
represents only the information available. In addition to the resources provided here, you may also be able to obtain advice and recommendations through discussion on
. Date of last update: 1/13/15.
This tool box contains materials pertaining to the access to private or state lands within wilderness areas, as found in Section 5 of the Wilderness Act of 1964. The private lands may be owned, or may be subject to valid mining claims or other valid occupancies (such as facilities associated with a water right). (For all other rights pertaining to mining, see the MINERALS Toolbox.) This toolbox does not cover Rights-of-Way associated with uses other than this broad group of inholdings and valid occupancies. Those are covered in the RIGHTS-OF-WAY Toolbox. Nor does it cover claims of RS2477 Rights-of-Way. Note that such are public rights-of-way, and do not apply to private access. This toolbox does not cover access to permitted structures for which there is no valid existing right (e.g., livestock facilities, which are addressed in the GRAZING toolbox). NOTE: Though the Arthur Carhart National Wilderness Training Center has made every effort to provide materials that are legally accurate, inholding access can readily become contentious, and it is critical that you contact your solicitor or general counsel if inholding access is an issue in your wilderness. Definitions
Non-federal land within the boundary of a wilderness designated by Congress. It does not include edge-holdings or cherry-stemmed holdings. Edge-holding
Non-federal land adjacent but not within the boundary of Wilderness designated by Congress. Edge-holdings usually are not accessed by a right-of-way through the wilderness. Cherry-stem holding
Non-federal land surrounded by lands designated by Congress as Wilderness except the point at which a non-wilderness road intersects the land. As neither the cherry-stemmed holding or the access to it are within the wilderness boundary, the provisions of the Wilderness Act do not apply. Basis in the Wilderness Act
Section 5 of the Wilderness Act of 1964 details how we are to manage State and private lands within wilderness areas: Sec. 5. (a) In any case where State-owned or privately owned land is completely surrounded by national forest lands within areas designated by this Act as wilderness, such State or private owner shall be given such rights as may be necessary to assure adequate access to such State-owned or privately owned land by such State or private owner and their successors in interest, or the State-owned land or privately owned land shall be exchanged for federally owned land in the same State of approximately equal value under authorities available to the Secretary of Agriculture: Provided, however, That the United States shall not transfer to a state or private owner any mineral interests unless the State or private owner relinquishes or causes to be relinquished to the United States the mineral interest in the surrounded land. Briefly, subsection (a) guarantees "adequate" access to inholdings and subsection (b) guarantees "reasonable" regulations will be used to provide access to valid mining claims or other valid occupancies. Naturally, the definitions of "adequate" and "reasonable" have been (and can be expected to continue to be) the subjects of litigation. See later sections of this Toolbox, (b) In any case where valid mining claims or other valid occupancies are wholly within a designated national forest wilderness area, the Secretary of Agriculture shall, by reasonable regulations consistent with the preservation of the area as wilderness, permit ingress and egress to such surrounded areas by means which have been or are being customarily enjoyed with respect to other such areas similarly situated. (c) Subject to the appropriation of funds by Congress, the Secretary of Agriculture is authorized to acquire privately owned land within the perimeter of any area designated by this Act as wilderness if (1) the owner concurs in such acquisition or (2) the acquisition is specifically authorized by Congress. Inholding Access in Subsequent Legislation and Relevant Case Law, for further information. Sub-section (c) makes it clear that the federal agency can purchase or exchange for an inholding with the owner's consent or if specifically authorized by Congress. (To date, Congress has not authorized a specific acquisition absent the owner's consent.) Purchased or exchanged lands automatically become designated as wilderness. Under the authority of Section 6(a) of the Wilderness Act, inholdings can also be given to the federal agency for management as wilderness. In addition, edge-holdings can also be given to the agency and automatically become part of the Wilderness after sixty days notice to the Congress.
Inholding Access in Subsequent Legislation Case Law
Alleman v. U.S., 372 F. Supp. 2d 1212 (9th Cir. 2005). Topic: Mining claim access Background: Plaintiff was the owner of an inholding and sought motorized access through federally designated wilderness. Plaintiff moved for quiet title citing the Quiet Title Act and The Wilderness Act. In 1988 the U.S. Government issued Plaintiff a patent (under the 1872 Mining Law) granting title to some 60 acres of surface and sub-surface estate within Oregon's Kalmiopsis Wilderness. The lands had previously been unpatented mining claims. Plaintiff had been using and maintaining forest roads in wilderness and violating other laws relating to wilderness and forest administration. Plaintiff and FS had been in communications about access issues. Plaintiff filed suit for quiet title ten years later. Holding: "The court finds that the land in question is National Forest System land as defined in 16 U.S.C. § 1609(a), and as such plaintiffs' common law easement claims are preempted by ANILCA and FLPMA. Adams, 255 F.3d at 794 (citing Adams v. U.S., 3 F.3d 1254, 1259 (9th Cir.1993))." The Court dismissed Plaintiff's claims and re-affirmed the rule that Plaintiff's predecessors and Plaintiff knew or should have known when the WSA was designated that there were to be no public roads within a WSA. Key Language: "The passage of the Wilderness Act put plaintiffs' and their predecessors in interest on notice that the government did not believe there were roads within the wilderness area; that the government claims a title interest in the trails in question in this dispute; and that motorized vehicles could not be used in a wilderness area."
Johnson v. USFS, No. 00 Civ. 217 (D. Mont. Apr. 2, 2002), aff'd, 93 F. App'x 133 (9th Cir. 2004) Topic: Inholding access Background: The Absaroka Trust, of which Johnson was a trustee, owned a 1245 acre inholding in the Absaroka-Beartooth Wilderness that consisted of 6 mining claims. The Trust planned to conduct exploratory mining activities and construct a lodge and cabins for recreational activities on the inholding. To access the property for those purposes, the Trust applied for a special use permit to build a 6 mile long gravel road through the wilderness area to the property, which was accessible only by foot, horseback or helicopter at the time. The Forest Service rejected the proposal as inconsistent with the Wilderness Act, finding that "traditionally access had been by foot or horseback or, more recently, by helicopter," and that this level of access was sufficient. The Trust sued, claiming that requiring construction materials be hauled to their land by horse or helicopter was so expensive as to be impracticable. Holding: The court affirmed the Forest Service's conclusion that the Trust's right to access the inholding via a newly constructed road did not outweigh the damage that road would cause to the wilderness character of the area. In reaching this decision, the Forest Service determined that no road had ever reached the inholding and that historically, access to the inholding was only by foot or horseback. Additionally, no road had been constructed in the wilderness area since it was designated and access by foot, horseback, or helicopter was consistent with similarly situated properties In the Absaroka-Beartooth Wilderness. Further, of the roughly 100 cases nationwide where motorized access had been granted to wilderness inholders, only one had allowed the construction of a new road. The Forest Service also found that the low mineral potential of the inholding did not justify the construction of a road for exploration. Thus, the court held that limiting the Trust to access by foot, horseback, and helicopter provided adequate access for the Trusts' stated purposes of recreation and mining exploration while still protecting the wilderness resources of the surrounding area. Key Language: "The Trust challenges the finding that access by foot, horseback, and helicopter was adequate for reasonable use and enjoyment of the property. The Trust contends that helicopter access is expensive and impracticable. ANILCA, however, does not guarantee the cheapest access, only adequate access." "The Wilderness Act and ANILCA provide [the inholder] a right of access adequate for the reasonable use and enjoyment of its property....ANILCA vests the Secretary with the discretionary authority to determine what type of access is adequate, andâ€¦the Wilderness Act directs [that this is] the same kind of access that has been or is being customarily enjoyed by other similarly situated areas." In determining similarly situated lands, "the Forest Service found that motor vehicles were allowed only on roads that existed prior to an area's wilderness designation. With only one exception [there was no permission] to construct new roads for motorized use." "Where a conflict in resource use exists, the preservation of wilderness predominates over other values."
Oregon Chapter of the Sierra Club, 172 I.B.L.A. 27 (2007) Topic: Inholding access Background: Owners of 4 connected inholdings in the Steens Mountain Wilderness had traditionally accessed their property via the 17-mile Ankle Creek Route, a primitive route that was difficult in places for a four-wheel-drive vehicle to navigate and that in other places was fading and becoming revegetated. After considering a number of possible alternatives, the BLM authorized "reasonable motorized use of the Ankle Creek Route...for landowners, lessees, guests or agents...to the extent that the route does not improve to a condition more highly developed than that which existed at the time Congress designated the area as wilderness. If monitoring indicates that motorized use is causing the route to become more obvious, use would be reduced in order to return the route to the desired condition. Access to the Ankle Creek Route...would be authorized during the period of time, generally May 15 to November 15, when damage [to the route]...would not occur." The inholders appealed the BLM decision to the IBLA, claiming the authorized access was too restrictive. Environmental groups also appealed, claiming the authorized access harmed the wilderness character of the area. Holding: Route and Mode of Access BLM regulations state that only a combination of routes and modes of travel to inholdings that (1) existed on the date Congress designated the area surrounding the inholding as wilderness, (2) serve the reasonable purposes for which the inholding is used, and (3) have the least impact on the wilderness character of the area will be approved. Because the inholders regularly accessed their property by motorized vehicle via the Ankle Creek Route prior to the wilderness designation, the IBLA upheld the BLM access decision regarding the route and mode of access. Degree of Access BLM regulations also state that once a route and mode of access have been authorized, BLM is within its discretion under the Wilderness Act as long as the degree of access authorized is no greater than that enjoyed prior to the wilderness designation. In this case, the IBLA upheld the BLM decision because the "BLM determined the level of motorized access previously enjoyed by these inholders, expressly limited access to predesignation levels, prohibited route improvements, and imposed requirements to ensure that the approved Ankle Creek route does not become more obvious than at the time of wilderness designation." Preservation of Wilderness Character The environmental groups claimed allowing motorized vehicles on the Ankle Creek Route harmed the wilderness character of the area. The IBLA rejected that claim, holding that the BLM was required only to preserve the wilderness character as it existed at the time of the wilderness designation, which included motorized use of the Ankle Creek Route by the inholders. Access Roads The IBLA held that "[s]ince section 5(a) of the Wilderness Act specifically provides for access to inholdings, it follows that access approved under that provision and its implementing regulations is necessarily excepted from the road and motorized use prohibition of section 4(c). It is irrelevant whether the approved route is road-like or appears to be a road, so long as it existed at the time of wilderness designation and is not improved thereafter." Key Language: As long as the degree, route, and mode of access are the same as they were prior to the wilderness designation, the access is adequate and the wilderness character of the area is not harmed. A road used for access to an inholding does not violate the Wilderness Act's prohibition on roads in wilderness areas.
IBLA 2004-291, etc. Topic: Inholding access Background: A 17-mile route has long been used for motorized access to four inholdings in the Steens Mountain Wilderness, designated in 2000, containing language which "identified special requirements for...access to in-holdings." After determining historical use of and various access routes to the inholdings, BLM authorized "motorized access for landowners, lessees, guests or agents...[as long as] the route does not improve to a condition more highly developed that that which existed at the time [of designation]." Environmental groups appealed, claiming the amount of access was too great; the inholders appealed, claiming the amount of access was too limited. Holding: "Mathematical precision is not required in determining the degree of access to be approvedâ€¦.Here BLM [properly] determined the level of access previously enjoyed..., prohibited route improvements, and imposed monitoring requirements to ensure the...route does not become more obvious." "Since the...route was not cherrystemmed, we assume at the time of designation that it was not then a 'road' and had not been improved to support regular and continuous use by...motorized vehicles." Hence, some greater level of restriction than a cherrystemmed route might have is appropriate. "The specific provisions of the Steens Act [for inholding access] (reasonable access for reasonable use) necessarily take precedence over the general rule reflected in the Wilderness Act (necessary to assure adequate access)....The statutory grant of access rights under the Steens Act isâ€¦potentially broader....BLM is not bound by general rules implementing the Wilderness Act's adequate access....On the other hand, [inholders'] claims to...unrestricted...access is clearly overbroad and inconsistent with the Steens Act."
Barnes v. Babbitt, 329 F. Supp. 2d 1141 (D.Ariz. 2004) Topic: Inholding access Background: Barnes owned a 40-acre inholding in the Arrastra Mountain Wilderness. In 1940 a jeep access to the property was bulldozed in, but by 1980 the route had become impassable. Before Barnes bought the inholding in 1990, the previous owner accessed the area by foot or horseback. The BLM authorized development of the route sufficient to permit a four-wheel-drive pickup truck to pass as necessary only for maintaining grazing developments on the inholding. Barnes was not satisfied with the restrictions; environmental groups were not satisfied with any access being allowed. Both appealed to IBLA, which affirmed the BLM decision. Still not satisfied, both then sued in District Court. Holding: "IBLA concluded that [the old route to the inholding meant] that the Act's prohibition against roads does not apply. Since the wilderness designation was determined by Congress, however, the IBLA was without authority to make a contrary determination." Congress's designation meant "the Arrastra Mountain area must have been 'roadless,' meaning that it lacked roads that had been improved or maintained by mechanical means for relatively regular and continuous use." "In 1996, when the Access Decision was issued, 'adequate access' meant 'the combination of routes and modes of travel to non-Federal inholdings that will, as determined by the authorized officer, serve the reasonable purposes for which the non-Federal lands are held or used, and at the same time cause impacts of least duration and degree on their wilderness character.' The IBLA decision was based at least in part on an improper evaluation of the wilderness character of the areaâ€¦and is contrary to the law." Further Development: The BLM has since further defined approved access to inholdings as the combination of routes and mode of travel that existed on the date the wilderness was designated. See the BLM Regulations elsewhere in this Toolbox. Key Lesson: Improvements made to existing routes to allow motorized access to an inholding may violate THE WILDERNESS ACT's prohibition on roads in wilderness areas.
Mathilda B. Williams, 124 I.B.L.A. 7 (1992) Topic: Inholding access Background: Williams owned an inholding in the Yolla Bolly-Middle Eel Wilderness Area accessible by motor vehicle via the Big Butte Road and a jeep road. When the area was designated as wilderness, the BLM decided that to access the inholding, Williams must obtain a lease to use the roads. Under FLPMA, the federal government is required to receive "fair market value" when it leases the use of public lands, such as these wilderness areas, to private individuals. 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(9). The proposed lease imposed the major restrictions on Williams' vehicular access to the inholding via the roads. Williams did not sign the lease and was denied vehicular access to the inholding. She subsequently appealed the rejection of her lease application. Holding: Restriction Mechanism The IBLA rejected Williams' appeal and held that the restrictive terms of the lease struck an appropriate balance allowing Williams adequate access to the inholding while protecting the wilderness character of the surrounding area. Federal agencies are free to grant access using the mechanism of their choice, be it a lease or a special use permit. Land Value BLM conducted an appraisal of the land occupied by the portion of the Big Butte Road to be leased by Williams and determined its fair market rental value was $900 per year. The IBLA set aside the appraisal because the BLM failed to consider the reduction in value of the right-of-way resulting from the restrictions placed on its use and enjoyment by the lease. Key Lessons: A federal agency can use any mechanism to restrict inholder access that balances the inholder's right to adequate access and the agency's obligation to preserve the wilderness character of the area. When determining the fair market value of the land to be leased, the appraisal should take into account the encumbrance placed on the land by the restrictive conditions of the lease that limit the use and enjoyment of the land.
Clouser v. Espy, 42 F.3d. 1522 (9th Cir. 1994) Topic: Mining claim access Background: Clouser owned an unpatented mining claim in an area that became the Kalmiopsis Wilderness in 1964. In 1990, Clouser filed a plan of operations, including the use of motor vehicles to access the claim. The Forest Service approved the plan with the stipulation that non-motorized means such as pack animals would have to be used to access the claims. Clouser claimed this restriction devalued his claim to the point that it affected the yet-to-be-determined validity of the claim. Holding: "There can be no doubt whatsoever that the Forest Service enjoys the authority to regulate means of access" to a mining claim. Section 5(b) gives an "unambiguous instruction to the Secretary of Agriculture...to determine what means are being or have been 'customarily enjoyed' in like areas." "Although Forest Service decisions regarding access may indeed affect whether a claim is found to be 'valid,' that fact in no way alters [Section 5(b)'s] unequivocal delegation of authority to the Secretary of Agriculture" even though Interior adjudicates claim validity. The Forest Service's restriction was upheld. Key Lessons: The Forest Service can regulate access to valid mining claims on wilderness inholdings even though the Department of the Interior determines whether the claims are valid.
Nelson v. United States, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1318 (N.D. Ga. 1999) Topic: Inholding access Elements of the Case: 1986 - Brasstown Wilderness designated, Congressional boundary drawn to include several private properties, but they are not surrounded by FS wilderness. 1987 - Subject landowner is prevented from driving through FS wilderness on an old 4WD road to the property, seeks right of access under 5(a). Court says 5(a) does not apply because the property is not completely surrounded. Court says landowner can revisit the issue if it becomes surrounded due to FS acquisition of adjoining lands. 1992 - Adjoining private land within the boundary of the Wilderness is acquired by FS, making the property completely surrounded by Wilderness. 1996 - Subject landowner applies for Special Use on Brasstown Wagon Road 1997 - FS denies use of Brasstown Wagon Road, and landowner returns to court. Two routes enter the property: the Brasstown Wagon Road, and the Yewell Cove Road. Both are unmaintained, rough, and require high clearance 4WD. Yewell Cove Road goes into a creek for a distance and crosses private land. Nelson does not have permission to cross the private land. This road accesses 4 of the 69 acres (the steep topography on the Nelson property prevents driving to the remainder). Brasstown Wagon Road is on a ridge and is accessed from college property, the college has given permission to Nelson to cross college property. This road accesses a larger part of the inholding. FS says they will allow the subject landowner with access via the Yewell Cove Road, but not the Brasstown Wagon Road. FS does little to investigate which of the two roads provides access to the FS boundary , it says it is up to Nelson to obtain access across private land. Background: Nelson purchased a 69 acre parcel that could be accessed by two different routes: the Brasstown Wagon Road, and the Yewell Cove Road. The purchase was made with the knowledge that the Brasstown Wagon Road would be closed due to the recent designation of wilderness. At the time the property was purchased, it was not surrounded by National Forest wilderness, but was within the boundary. A previous court found that Section 5(a) of the Wilderness Act did not apply because the property was not surrounded by wilderness, but the issue could be revisited when or if the Forest Service acquired additional lands that resulted in the property becoming completely surrounded. Five years later the FS did, indeed, acquire additional lands in the wilderness boundary resulting in the property becoming completely surrounded. Nelson then submitted a Special Use Application seeking adequate access including the removal of a gate on the Brasstown Wagon Road to allow for permanent public use, and requested permission to improve the road to make it passable by non-four wheel drive vehicles, and a utility easement to provide lighting for the road. The Forest Service denied Nelson's application because the inholding could be accessed via the Yewell Cove Road. Because of the topography of the property, the Yewell Cove Road provided access to less than 4 acres of the inholding. Nelson had permission to use the Brasstown Wagon Road outside the National Forest boundary, but did not have permission to use the Yewell Cove Road outside the National Forest boundary. The Forest Service did not take this into account, reasoning that it is up to the landowner to gain access over private property. Nelson appealed the Forest Service's decision. Holding: The court vacated the Forest Service's decision as arbitrary and capricious because "the Forest Service failed to consider whether the Yewell Cove Road constituted adequate access." The Forest Service had only considered the portion of the route that was within the Forest boundary. The court found the Forest Service's position to be untenable because"[u]nder the Forest Service's reasoning, landlocked parcels are considered to have adequate access as long as a right of access exists over adjoining Forest Service land, even if the landowners cannot access the Forest Service's purported right of way over adjacent private property." The court said that Section 5(a) requires adequate access be provided, which is a higher standard than the "any access" test the Forest Service is relying upon. Legal Use of the Route The Forest Service failed to determine whether Nelson had a legal right to use the Yewell Cove Road crossing private property prior to reaching the Forest boundary. Under federal regulations at 36 C.F.R. § 251.114(f)(1) and the mandates of Section 5(a), if a landowner is seeking access, the agency must consider whether the landowner has demonstrated a lack of adequate access. Signs on the road warning trespassers suggested the private property owners would assert their rights to prevent Nelson from using the road. Physical Condition of the Route The Forest Service also failed to determine whether the portion of the Yewell Cove Road that descended into the creek bed provided adequate access. The Forest Service did not consider the environmental effects on the creek from having vehicles drive in it, nor did it consider the possibility of diverting the creek because that portion of the road was on private property. Key Lessons: Section 5(a) only applies to lands that are completely surrounded by wilderness. An inholding may not meet this requirement at the time of designation, but if the parcel later becomes completely surrounded by wilderness through subsequent agency land acquisitions, Section 5(a) then applies. In considering a choice between two potential routes of access, a federal agency must consider the entirety of each access route, including portions that lay outside of federal property, when determining which route provides adequate access.
Alaska Wildlife Alliance v. Jensen, 108 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 1997) Topic: Access - motorized use and commercial enterprise Background: Plaintiff groups challenged National Park Service (NPS) regulations that allowed commercial fishing in designated wilderness areas and non-wilderness areas of Glacier Bay NP. Fishing industry group intervened against Plaintiffs. The fishermen argued that under a statutory exemption, motorized use in Glacier Bay National Park predated the Wilderness Act and was thus allowable. Holding: The court responded that commercial fishing was at issue, not motorized use. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed lower court's decision that The Wilderness Act and the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act 16 U.S.C. §§ 3101 et seq., (ANILCA) (the Act establishing the Glacier Bay National Park's Wilderness areas) prohibit commercial fishing in the Park's wilderness areas. The Ninth Circuit also affirmed lower court decision deferring to NPS' interpretation of its Organic Act and ANILCA, wherein the agency has discretion to permit or to prohibit commercial fishing in non-wilderness areas of the Park.
United States v. Gotchnik, 222 F.3d 506 (8th Cir. 2000) Topic: Access - Motorized vehicle use for traditional use rights Background: The Chippewa Indian tribe challenged convictions for using motor vehicle use in a wilderness area on the basis that their treaty with the United States preserved their right to use evolving and modern methods for hunting. Appellants thus clearly possess the right to hunt and fish in the ceded territory encompassed within the Boundary Waters Area. The question, then, is whether the Boundary Water Act's prohibition of the use of motorboats and motor vehicles in this area, and the government's prosecution of appellants under this prohibition, offends appellants' rights under the Treaty. Appellants argue that the Treaty, by securing their right to hunt and fish, also secures their right to use modern transportation methods to move about the ceded territory whenever they are exercising their hunting and fishing rights. To support their position, appellants cite cases involving treaties with similar usufructuary right provisions in which courts held that tribal members were not confined to the use of hunting and fishing implements that existed at the time of the Treaty signing. The government, in response, concedes that the Treaty protects appellants' right to use modern hunting and fishing techniques, but asserts that it does not similarly authorize the use of modern means of transportation to reach the most desirable hunting and fishing locations. Holding: "We agree with the government that there is a consequential distinction between appellants' use of evolving hunting and fishing implements and their use of modern means of transportation. The Treaty secures appellants' right to subsistence hunt and fish in the ceded territory. The use of modern gaming instruments and techniques goes to the very essence of these protected activities, whereas the use of the most advanced means of transportation to reach desired hunting and fishing areas is merely peripheral to them." "A motorboat, all-terrain vehicle, or helicopter for that matter, may make it easier to reach a preferred fishing or hunting spot within the Boundary Waters Area, but the use of such motorized conveyances is not part and parcel of the protected act of hunting or fishing, as is the use of a rifle, ice augur, or other hunting or fishing instrument. Thus, we conclude that although the use of evolving hunting and fishing implements may have been within the understanding of the signatory Bands, the same cannot reasonably be said of the use of modern modes of transportation to reach desired hunting and fishing areas." "In sum, we conclude that the Boundary Water Act's prohibition of the use of motorboats and motor vehicles in the Boundary Waters Area does not offend appellants' rights under the Treaty."
Isle Royale Boaters Association v. Norton, 154 F.Supp. 2d 1098 (W.D. Mich. 2001), affirmed by 330 F.3d 777 (6th Cir. 2003) Topic: Access - Motorized boat use Background: The National Park Service announced plans to remove or relocate many docks on the island in order to provide separate motorized and non-motorized areas on a wilderness area island. The plaintiffs for this case alleged that the removal of docks and a portage trail violated the Wilderness Act and accompanying regulations by being contrary to the Wilderness Act's stated purpose of "preserving [the wilderness area's] character for the use and enjoyment of the American people." Holding: The court found that NPS' removal or replacement of four docks was not arbitrary and capricious. The court cited the Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c), noting the Act's provision that there should generally be no motorboats allowed in wilderness areas except as necessary to meet the minimum requirements of the administration of the area. THE WILDERNESS ACT further provides that where motorboat uses have already been established within an area that becomes wilderness, such use may be permitted to continue "subject to such restrictions as the Secretary of Agriculture deems desirable." 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d). The court noted that "while in this case it is the Secretary of the Interior, or the NPS, that regulates Isle Royale, there is no reason that 1133(d) should not apply to their regulation of the Park. Even if it did not, the NPS maintains the ability under 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131(b) and 1133(a)(3) to regulate the Park. The court upheld NPS' general ability to zone the Park and replace particular docks as part of the agency's ability to regulate the Park. Isle Royale Boaters Ass'n v. Norton, 154 F.Supp.2d 1098 at 1117-8." "Zoning involves regulating use either within or outside of Congressionally approved wilderness areas. Unless the zoning violates the Wilderness Act, it is permissible. Id. at 1119." The court found that Section 4(d)(1) specifically granted to the Secretary of Agriculture the power to permit motorboat usage in areas where the use had already been established. Because this case involved the Secretary of the Interior through the NPS, the court held that the statute should extend to the NPS, enabling it to regulate the park. Within the authority to regulate exists the ability to replace particular docks. The court found the arguments of the plaintiffs particularly not compelling because many of the docks were simply being moved to another section of the island. Therefore, the NPS plans to remove or relocate docks did not violate the Wilderness Act. Key lesson: The Secretary has the power to regulate motorboat use in Wilderness Areas, and this authority extends to the removal and replacement of docks.
River Runners for Wilderness v. Martin Topic: Access - Motorized Raft Use in "NPS Recommended Wilderness" Background: A coalition of four wilderness advocacy groups (River Runners for Wilderness; Rock the Earth; Wilderness Watch and Living Rivers) brought suit against the National Park Service in March 2006, under the Administrative Procedures Act, challenging the park's 2006 Colorado River Management Plan (CRMP), which among other things, permits the continued use of motorized rafts and support equipment on the Colorado River within Grand Canyon National Park. A hearing was held in October 2007, in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona in which United States District Judge David G. Campbell heard oral arguments, and then rendered a decision in November 2007 in favor of the National Park Service. The Plaintiffs appealed that decision in 2008 to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Holding:"Plaintiffs have failed to establish that the Park Service acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it adopted the 2006 Management Plan. The court accordingly AFFIRMS the granting of the summary judgment motions of Defendants and Intervenors and the denial of the summary judgment motion of Plaintiffs." Key lesson: "Congress has never acted on the Park Service's recommendation that portions of the Park be formally designated as wilderness. The Park Service, therefore, is not under the same "statutory responsibility" that applied to the Forest Service in Blackwell. The court must look to the Concessions Act, not the Wilderness Act, for the governing legal standard." "Defendants have identified a number of factors in the Administrative Record that support the Park Service's decision to allow motorized traffic to continue. First, because motorized trips take less time to complete (10 days as opposed to 16 days for non-motorized trips), substantially more people can see the Park each year from the river if motorized trips continue. FEIS Vol. I at 33-34; Vol. III at 87-88, 328-29. Second, motorized trips are frequently chartered for special-needs groups, educational classes, family reunions, or to support kayak or other paddle trips. Third, because of their increased mobility, motorized trips help alleviate overcrowding at popular campsites and attractions in the Corridor. FEIS Vol. I at 33-34; Vol. III at 302. Fourth, some individuals feel safer when traveling in motorized rafts. FEIS Vol. III at 312-313. In addition, studies performed as part of the DEIS found that visitors are able to experience the river as wilderness in the presence of motorized uses and that those who took motorized trips were significantly more likely to stress safety and trip length as the most important factors in the choosing the type of trip they took."
660 F. 2d 1240 - State of Minnesota Alexander v. John R Block Topic: Access - Buffer zones Background: The State of Minnesota, joined by the National Association of Property Owners (NAPO) and numerous individuals, businesses, and organizations brought suit against the United States, challenging the constitutionality of the BWCAW Act as applied to lands and waters that the federal government does not own. A group of organizations concerned with the environmental and wilderness aspects of the boundary waters intervened in support of the United States. The challenged portion of the statute, section 4, prohibits the use of motorboats in the BWCAW in all but a small number of lakes. The Act also limits snowmobiles to two routes. The United States owns ninety percent of the land within the borders of the BWCAW area. The State of Minnesota, in addition to owning most of the remaining ten percent of the land, owns the beds of all the lakes and rivers within the BWCAW. Appellants assert that Congress had no power to enact the motor vehicle restriction as applied to nonfederal lands and waters. Holding: "We reject this contention and conclude that Congress, in passing this legislation, acted within its authority under the property clause of the United States Constitution and that such action did not contravene the tenth amendment of the Constitution. Accordingly, we affirm." Key lesson: "Having established that Congress may regulate conduct off federal land that interferes with the designated purpose of that land, we must determine whether Congress acted within this power in restricting the use of motorboats and other motor vehicles in the BWCAW. In reviewing the appropriateness of particular regulations, "we must remain mindful that, while courts must eventually pass upon them, determinations under the Property Clause are entrusted primarily to the judgment of Congress." Kleppe v. New Mexico, supra, 426 U.S. at 536, 96 S.Ct. at 2290. Accord, United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29-30, 60 S.Ct. 749, 756, 84 L.Ed. 1050 (1940); United States v. Brown, supra, 552 F.2d at 822. Thus, if Congress enacted the motorized use restrictions to protect the fundamental purpose for which the BWCAW had been reserved, and if the restrictions in section 4 reasonably relate to that end, we must conclude that Congress acted within its constitutional prerogative."
Izaak Walton League v. Kimbell (D.Minn. 2007), Izaak Walton League v. Kimbell (8th Cir. 2009) Topic: Access - Buffer zones Background: In 2003, the Forest Service identified an unlawful snowmobile route-Tilbury Trail-located in the Superior National Forest, which connected McFarland Lake in the west to South Fowl Lake. South Fowl Lake, along with North Fowl Lake, is the easternmost lake in a chain of lakes along the border between northeast Minnesota and Canada. The Forest Service closed Tilbury Trail because it encroached on Royal Lake and Royal River, located within the BWCAW along the northern edge of the trail. Following the trail's closure, the only available snowmobile access route to South Fowl Lake was Cook County Road 16, which required snowmobiles to share a steep and potentially dangerous road with cars and trucks. Seeking to develop a safe alternative route that would provide public snowmobile access to South Fowl Lake, the Forest Service proposed construction of South Fowl Trail, connecting McFarland Lake to South Fowl Lake along the same general route as Tilbury Trail. In November 2005, the Forest Service released an EA for the proposed South Fowl Trail. Based on the analysis set forth in the EA, the Forest Service issued a Decision Notice (DN) and Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) on February 21, 2006, approving the selection of the second alternative trail for the South Fowl Trail. Regarding sound impact, the FONSI stated that the decibel level of a snowmobile in the adjoining wilderness, at a distance of 600 to 800 feet from the proposed route, would be approximately 49 decibels. The FONSI concluded that this decibel level was not significant. Wilderness Watch filed suit against the Forest Service, alleging, inter alia: (1) that the Forest Service had allowed snowmobiles on South Fowl Lake in violation of the BWCAW Act ("Count I"); (2) that the Forest Service has failed to implement motorboat quotas on North and South Fowl Lakes in violation of §4(f) of the BWCAW Act ("Count II"); and (3) that the Forest Service violated NEPA by failing to prepare an EIS for the proposed trail ("Count V"). Wilderness Watch, the Forest Service, and the Intervenors filed cross-motions for summary judgment on each of Wilderness Watch's claims. 2007 District Court Holding: The district court found that the Fowl Lakes were not located within the wilderness area prescribed under the BWCAW. In a subsequent opinion, the district court, inter alia, granted the Forest Services's motion for summary judgment on Counts I and II of the complaint but denied the motion as to Count V. The district court held that the Forest Service's decisions to construct a snowmobile trail connecting lakes adjacent to the BWCAW and not to set motorboat quotas on the Fowl Lakes were not arbitrary and capricious under the Wilderness Act and the BWCAW Act. But the district court found that the EA prepared by the Forest Service for the plan to construct the snowmobile trail connecting the Fowl Lakes adjacent to the BWCAW failed to properly analyze the noise impact resulting from snowmobile use on the trail, as required under NEPA. According to the court, the EA provided no quantitative evidence or analysis of decibel levels to be projected by the trail into the adjoining wilderness. Finding the decision to issue a FONSI arbitrary and capricious, the district court remanded the matter to the Forest Service, ordering it to "promptly prepare an EIS to evaluate more thoroughly the sound impact in the BWCAW, and to suspend further activity on the South Fowl Trail pending completion of the EIS." 2009 8th Circuit Background: Both Wilderness Watch and the Intervenors appeal from the district court's judgment. According to Wilderness Watch, the only plausible reading of §4 of the BWCAW Act is that Congress specifically included these lakes in the BWCAW and intended the motor-use restrictions specified in §4 to apply to those lakes. In response, the Forest Service and the Intervenors argue that Wilderness Watch's claims in Counts I and II of the complaint are barred by the six-year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) because all of the harms of which Wilderness Watch complains are the result of Congress's exclusion of the Fowl Lakes from the BWCAW on April 4, 1980, when the Forest Service published the maps and legal description showing the boundaries of the BWCAW in the Federal Register. Second, as to Wilderness Watch's claim that the Forest Service violated NEPA, the Intervenors argue that the district court erroneously found that the issuance of a FONSI and the failure to complete an EIS were arbitrary and capricious regarding the consideration of the potential sound impact from the Fowl Lake project. 8th Circuit Court Holding: "Because the latest possible accrual date is April 4, 1980, and because Wilderness Watch did not file the instant action until August 17, 2006, its claims in Counts I and II are time-barred. Accordingly, we hold that Wilderness Watch's claims that the Forest Service (1) violated the BWCAW Act by permitting snowmobiles on South Fowl Lake and (2) failed to implement motorboat quotas on North and South Fowl Lakes in violation of §4(f) of the BWCAW Act are time-barred by the six-year statute of limitations." "As to the district court's NEPA ruling, we lack jurisdiction to review the district court's order remanding the matter to the Forest Service for an EIS and decline to vacate the injunction." Key Language: Preserving wilderness character - "The plain language of § 4(b) of the Wilderness Act makes no distinction based on the source of the allegedly degrading agency activity. Rather, § 4(b) mandates that any agency administering the wilderness area shall be responsible for preserving the wilderness character of the area." Buffer zones - "[A]n agency's duty to preserve the wilderness character under § 4(b) of the Act may apply to agency activity that occurs outside the boundary of the wilderness area....The key question in determining whether agency action violates § 4(b) of the Wilderness Act is whether the action degrades the wilderness character of a designated wilderness area." "Congress can insulate the wilderness by imposing restrictions...very close to the wilderness area 'to insure (sic) that these lands be protected against interference with their intended purposes.' Minnesota v. Block, 660 F.2d, 1249 (8th Cir. 1981) (holding Congress has the power under the Property Clause of Article IV of the Constitution to regulate 'conduct on or off the public land that would threaten the designated purpose of federal and')."
Stuart Dow et al. v. United States, CV-02-2158-PCT-SMM (2005) Topic: Inholding access Background: 1922 - 160 acres patented under Stock Raising Homestead Act land then sold to Dow in 1926. 1990 - Hells Canyon Wilderness designated, Dow property becomes an inholding. 1998 - Dow family (multiple heirs own property) files a Land Use Application to blade and drive Garfias Wash Road (BLM disputes calling this a road). 2001 - BLM allows Dow to drive the route as it was, but not to blade, maintain, or upgrade the road. 2000 - Dow files lawsuit seeking to quite title to an easement he claims exists by necessity, by implication, by express authorization, and by estoppel. Dow anticipates building residential development on the property, this would require greater levels of access than currently has occurred. The route entering the property is a wash, not a maintained road, but there is indication that this route was used for access at, and up to , the time of designation. Court says: "It is undisputed that [Dow has] a right of access to the Dow Property pursuant to BLM authorization; what they seek is a greater right of access in the form of a property interest." Court says: common law doctrine pertaining to easements may be claimed against federal government, unless preempted by another law. ANILCA preempts common law doctrine for Alaska and nationwide for Forest Service administered lands Holding: Four common law causes of action are considered to determine existence of an easement: easement by necessity If easement was needed at the time of severance (when the patent was issued), one exists even if not expressly authorized. Because cross country driving was allowed at time of patent, an easement was not necessary, so an easement by necessity does not exist. easement by implication Normally nothing passes under a land grant (patent) except what is conveyed in clear language. However, when Congress grants land for a particular purpose, the purposes for which the grant was enacted results in an easement by implication. Such an easement exists for the purpose of the grant, but not for purposes in excesses of the grant. In the Dow case, the land was granted for stock raising and raising crops, not for residential development; there is not a right to the greater degree of access that residential development would require, and which Dow is seeking. easement by express authorization Expressly identified easements are valid to the degree they are expressed. In the Dow case there is no expressly identified easement to the property. Dow attempts to imply a road easement is expressly granted as an appurtenance; the patent includes rights to the appurtenances on the property. The appurtenances in the land grant are not expressly identified, though the patent application does expressly identify a road (as well as structures and fences) on the land grant, but no appurtenances on any adjoining lands. The court says the appurtenances included as a part of the land grant were those in existence at the time of the land grant; the term appurtenance in a patent does not create an easement where one did not exist before. "If Congress had intended to grant an easement to Plaintiffs as part of the land grant, it would have made its intention clear through more explicit language." easement by estoppel Where the grantor of land (in this case the Federal government) acts to affirmatively and beyond mere negligence provide the grantee with reason to believe an easement exists, an easement may be claimed. Congress provided an implied easement to cross federal lands, but never acted affirmatively to make the homesteader believe that a specific easement exists or an easement for access exists in excess of that needed for the purpose of the grant. Dow is not entitled to an easement across federal land greater than the right of access they currently have under BLM authorization.
Stupak-Thrall v. U.S., 843 F. Supp. 327 (W.D. Mich. 1994); (Quist, J.), affirmed, 70 F.3d 881 (6th Cir. 1995), vacated, 81 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 1996), affirmed by an equally divided en banc court, 89 F.3d 1269 (6th Cir. 1996). Topic: Access - (sail-powered watercraft, watercraft designed for or used as floating living quarters, and nonburnable disposable food and beverage containers) Background: Plaintiffs own land on the northern shore of Crooked Lake, in Michigan's Upper Peninsula near the Wisconsin border. Because of their ownership, plaintiffs possess "riparian," or "littoral," rights under Michigan law--i.e., common property interests in Crooked Lake's surface.2 Plaintiffs have the right to make reasonable use of the entire surface, which includes, at core, those uses "absolutely necessary for the existence of the riparian proprietor and his family, such as to quench thirst and for household purposes." Thompson v. Enz, 379 Mich. 667, 154 N.W.2d 473, 483 (1967). Additional, though less fundamental, riparian uses include "those which merely increase one's comfort and prosperity ... such as commercial profit and recreation." Id., 154 N.W.2d at 484. The United States is also a riparian owner. In fact, the vast majority of Crooked Lake's shoreline, about 95%, lies within the Sylvania Wilderness Area, a national wilderness administered by the Forest Service, and private riparian ownership such as plaintiffs' exists only along a tiny bay jutting out to the north of the wilderness. Nevertheless, the nature of riparian ownership is such that each owner shares rights to the whole lake, so long as his or her land touches the lake waters. Rice v. Naimish, 8 Mich.App. 698, 155 N.W.2d 370, 373 (1967). At issue are certain management prescriptions of the Forest Service relating to the portion of Crooked Lake lying within the Sylvania Wilderness Area. Amendment No. 1, adopted by the Forest Service in 1992 to amend its national forest land and resource management plan governing the Sylvania Wilderness, prohibits, among other things, the use of "sail-powered watercraft," "watercraft designed for or used as floating living quarters," and "[n]onburnable disposable food and beverage containers" in the wilderness. (Admin.Rec.36, 38.) Land and resource management plans are prepared under the guidelines of 16 U.S.C. Sec. 1604 and 36 C.F.R. Sec. 219, which provide for notice and opportunity to comment on proposed plans and amendments, and Amendment No. 1 was properly adopted pursuant to this framework. Notably, Amendment No. 1 has no effect on the small bay outside the wilderness area on which plaintiffs' properties lie. But because plaintiffs have riparian rights in the whole surface of Crooked Lake, they claim that Amendment No. 1's restrictions on sailboats, houseboats, and food containers are an unauthorized infringement of their rights to unrestricted use of the entire lake. Holding: "The extent and validity of federal power under the Wilderness Act of 1964 and the Michigan Wilderness Act of 1987 form the central issues of this appeal. Plaintiffs are possessors of surface rights to a lake, held in common with the United States. They challenge certain United States Forest Service restrictions on activities on the lake, claiming that they are beyond the Forest Service's statutory and constitutional authority. The district court upheld the restrictions, finding them to be within the power granted by the Property Clause of Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2, and finding that plaintiffs' property rights were subject to reasonable regulation under Michigan law. Because we conclude that the Property Clause gives Congress the power to regulate the lake, that Congress has delegated authority to the Forest Service to regulate the lake, and that regulation of the lake does not exceed the wilderness acts' express limitations deferring to state law property rights, we affirm."
Stupak-Thrall v. Glickman 988 F. Supp. 1055 (W.D. Mich. 1997). Topic: Access - (motorboat use) Background: The plaintiffs owned property along the shores of Crooked Lake, which lies within the Sylvania Wilderness, a part of the National Wilderness Preservation System, in the Ottawa National Forest. The plaintiffs argued that Amendment No. 5 of the Ottawa National Forest Land and Resource Management Plan, regulating the use of gas-powered motorboats on parts of Crooked Lake, was beyond the authority of the Forest Service. Holding: The court found that motorboat restrictions on Crooked Lake constituted an unlawful act by the Forest Service and a taking under the Fifth Amendment. However, the ruling applied only to Crooked Lake because it has the unique situation of private citizens inhabiting its shoreline who depend on motorboat access for business. The court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Finally, Amendment No. 5 was declared null and void in that it was beyond the authority of the Forest Service as granted by the Michigan Wilderness Act of 1987 (MWA).
Stupak-Thrall v. Glickman, 346 F.3d 579, 584-85 (6th Cir. 2003). Topic: Access Background: Plaintiffs-Appellants, seeking a declaration that Crooked Lake is not part of the Sylvania Wilderness area and therefore is not within the regulatory authority of the United States Forest Service, appeal the district court's decision dismissing as time-barred their claim against the United States. Holding: "Because we find that the plaintiffs' claims are untimely and that the government did not waive its right to raise a statute of limitations defense, we will AFFIRM the district court's grant of summary judgment to the plaintiff." See Stupak-Thrall v. Glickman 988 F. Supp. 1055 (W.D. Mich. 1997).
Wilderness Watch et al. I.B.L.A. 2003-72 (2006) Topic: Inholding access Background: Siefker and Schunn owned 60 acres of vacant land in the Mount Tipton Wilderness. The partners planned to build a ranch house, barn, riding area, and stables on the property. To access the property, the partners filed an application to reconstruct an "existing roadway" by grading and adding culverts to make it permanently passable for two round trips daily during three seasons, and one round trip daily during winter totaling approximately 640 trips per year. The subject route was a jeep trail receiving light use from random vehicles. After some negotiation with the landowner, and the consideration of alternatives in an EA, BLM rejected upgrading of the route but allowed maintenance without motorized or mechanized equipment and authorized approximately 143 trips during construction work on the private parcel, and after, 91 trips per year. Wilderness Watch filed an appeal with the IBLA contending that BLM "presumed that it must provide, as "adequate," whatever form of motorized access a person may wish to pursue inside a pre-established wilderness." BLM stated that "existence of a route leading to an inholding is sufficient evidence that landowners may have used the route to access their property," and that it is "providing that access which existed on the date of the wilderness designation, based on evidence that recreationists and ranchers were using the identified route." Holding: BLM must make a finding of the inholding owner's use occurring at the time of designation, and it is this level of use that the inholder may be authorized to exercise after wilderness designation. "BLM [is required] to make a finding regarding the extent of allowable motorized use by the inholder to the inholding in question, not by the general public." "The distinction between allowing motorized versus nonmotorized use is to be made based on the nature of use by the parcel holder at the time of designation; it is not to be based, as BLM suggests in the DR, on what is 'reasonable and practical *** to accomplish the stated objectives [of the inholder] for the private land.'" BLM also must protect wilderness character to the extent possible while providing the access required by law. "BLM may only approve the method of access which 'causes the least impact on wilderness character.' BLM would be required to make this finding whatever mode of access is ultimately authorized." The IBLA reversed BLM's decision because the authorized use was in excess of the use that was occurring at the time of wilderness designation. "While the route was clearly delineated and vehicles traversed the land, the finding that the use of the route as a road subject to regular and continuous motorized transportation is consistent with the state of affairs in 1990 [year of designation] is not supported by the record as a matter of fact and is an error of law." "The fact that the vehicle route 'was in use by motor vehicles prior to wilderness designation,' does not mean that increasing motorized access to the level of regular and continuous use such that it will be perceived as a road is consistent..." "We reverse the [decision] to the extent that it concluded that the access authorized was consistent with use of the route at the time of wilderness designation." Key Lesson: BLM must make a finding as to what use was occurring at the time of designation. This then forms the basis for the level of permitted access to the inholding. Allowed is the level of use of the federal land at the time of designation, not additional use in order to accomplish the objectives the land owner has for the private land. Allowing use of a route in excess what occurred by the inholding owner at the time of designation, such that the route would effectively become upgraded to the level of a road, is not appropropriate. Management Policies, Guidelines, Processes, and Templates
Multiple Agency Comparison BLM
Regulations (43 CFR 6305)
Policy (6340 1.6.C.9) FWS
Policy - Natural and Cultural Resources Management, Part 610 Wilderness Stewardship
Chapter 2 Wilderness Administration and Resource Stewardship, 610 FW 2
2.10 May the Service authorize access through wilderness to non-Federal land where rights to access do not exist? Where there is existing access or a right of access through nonwilderness land, we will generally not allow access through wilderness other than that available to the general public. We will give State or private landowners, and their successors in interest, effectively surrounded by or adjacent to wilderness, access to their land through wilderness where such access is appropriate and compatible with the purposes of the refuge, including the purposes of the Wilderness Act, and does not involve uses generally prohibited by the Wilderness Act. We will only approve that combination of routes and modes of travel which will, as determined by the Refuge System, cause the least lasting impact on wilderness character. We will authorize such access through a renewable special use permit for a period not to exceed 5 years. See 610 FW 5 for some of the additional provisions applicable in Alaska. Chapter 5 Special Provisions for Alaska Wilderness, 610 FW 5
5.6 What special provisions apply to access to inholdings in Alaska wilderness areas? Section 1110(b) of ANILCA requires that we give the owners of valid inholdings adequate and feasible access, for economic or other purposes, across a refuge, including a designated wilderness area. An inholding is State-owned or privately owned land, including subsurface rights underlying public lands, valid mining claims, or other valid occupancy that is within or effectively surrounded by one or more conservation system units. We require a right-of-way permit for access to an inholding only when section 1110(b) does not provide adequate and feasible access without a right-of-way permit (43 CFR 36.10(b)). When a right-of-way permit is necessary under this provision, we process the application in accordance with regulations in 43 CFR 36.10 and 50 CFR 29.21. Chapter 5 Special Provisions for Alaska Wilderness, 610 FW 5
5.8 What special provisions apply to authorization of temporary access to non-Federal lands? A. Section 1111 of ANILCA requires the Service to authorize and permit temporary access across wilderness to State or private land by a landowner for the purpose of survey, geophysical, exploratory, or other temporary uses where access will not result in permanent harm to the resources of the area or lands. Regulations at 43 CFR 36.12 implementing section 1111 of ANILCA define temporary access to State or private lands as limited, short-term access, which does not require permanent facilities. B. The landowner seeking access must complete an application for temporary access (SF 299). After evaluating the application and ensuring that no permanent harm will result to the resources of the area, the refuge may issue a special use permit with the necessary stipulations and conditions. FS
Regulations (36 CFR 293.12, 293.13), Policy (FSM 2320.5.15; 2326), and Management Practices Examples of Plans or Guidance
1995 guidance for authorizing inholding access in areas designated by the California Desert Protection Act Documents supporting edge-holding donation as wilderness addition
Inventory of potential addition
EA supporting Wilderness designation of donated land
Transmittal memos to Secretary and Congress supporting addition Training Materials
Wilderness in the Courts Webinar Series, Session 3: Inholding Access This webinar was held on May 15, 2013 at 12:30 PM Eastern time. The 90-minute session featured Peter Appel, the Alex W. Smith Professor of Law at the University of Georgia Law School, and introduced participants to the topic through case studies analyzing access for inholdings, inholdings and grazing, private rights, and mining claims.
PowerPoint Resources and References
Pearson, M. and Wallace, G. H. (1994).
Prioritizing the acquisition of Wilderness inholdings. Fort Collins, CO: Department of Natural Resource Recreation and Tourism, Colorado State University. Tanner, R. (2002).
Inholdings within Wilderness: Legal Foundations, Problems, and Solutions. International Journal of Wilderness, 8(3): 9-14. Wilderness Stewardship Reference System (WSRS)
General Administration > Inholdings
General Administration > Access